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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Big-D Construction Corporation ("Big-D") agrees with the Statement of

Jurisdiction contained in Appellant Marlene Begaye's principal brief.
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARD OF
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Did Judge Hilder properly grant summary judgment to Big-D because there was no

evidence that Big-D, the general contractor, retained control over the subcontractor's
manner and method of supporting the wall that collapsed on Michael Begaye?
This issue was preserved at R. 227-29. The appellate court reviews the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness. Machock v. Fink, 137 P.3d 779, 782
(Utah 2006). There are no statutes that are determinative of this issue.
III.

INTRODUCTION
The construction project where Michael Begaye was killed was not atypical from

many other large-scale construction projects in how it was structured and how it operated.
The project owner contracted with an experienced industrial general contractor, Big-D, to
construct a building at the University of Utah. Like the typical general contractor, Big-D
had the skills to manage and supervise the project; in short, it was Big-D's job to make
sure the structure was built. Big-D turned to subcontractors with the expertise to handle
specific parts of the project. These subcontractors, such as Mr. Begaye's employer
Preferred, knew how to complete their assignment from start to finish. They coordinated
with Big-D frequently to make sure the overall project progressed in the most efficient
1

way, but they were the masters of their day-to-day work on the project. They supervised
their crews, told them what to do and how to do it, and provided them the tools and
equipment needed to do their job. They had control over their workers and how their
workers performed their jobs.
This was not the type of construction project where Big-D insinuated itself into the
details of Preferred's work. It did not control the manner and method of Preferred's
work, and more importantly, it was not controlling how Preferred erected the wall at the
time Mr. Begaye was killed. That was Preferred's job. Preferred was the expert on how
to do it.
Big-D cannot be liable to Mrs. Begaye in its capacity as the general contractor on
the project unless Big-D effectively became Mr. Begaye's employer that day and directed
the manner and method of bracing the wall that fell on him. Because that did not happen,
Mrs. Begaye tries on appeal to turn Big-D's normal activities as a general contractor into
unique and unusual exertions of control over Preferred's work. She argues that Big-D's
powers to ensure overall safety on the project and to move the project forward, which are
standard and necessary powers of a general contractor on a large project, trigger the
exception to the rule that general contractors are not liable for injuries to a subcontractor's employee. These are arguments that Utah courts and courts in other jurisdictions
have previously considered and rejected. This is not one of those rare cases where the

2

retained control exception to the rule of non-liability applies. Judge Hilder appropriately
granted summary judgment to Big-D, and this Court should affirm that ruling.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
A. Statement of Facts
Marlene Begaye, widow of Michael Begaye, filed a wrongful death lawsuit after

her husband Michael Begaye was killed while working on a construction site in Salt Lake
City in March 2004. (R. 1-6). Big-D was the general contractor on a construction
project to build the Health Sciences Education Building at the University of Utah.
(R. 539). Big-D hired Preferred Steel, Inc. ("Preferred") as the concrete and masonry
subcontractor. (R. 822). Michael Begaye was employed by Preferred. (R. 2).
The bid document between Big-D and Preferred described Preferred5 s scope of
work in part as "furnishing and installing reinforcing steel and accessories for cast in place
concrete and furnishing reinforcing steel for unit masonry . . . ." (R. 822). Preferred
agreed to provide "[a]ll labor, materials, and equipment for complete installation of [the]
trade . . ." and to be responsible for "calling for inspections related to [its] trade."
(R. 822). Moreover, Preferred agreed in the Subcontract Agreement to provide a safe
workplace for its employees:
At all times while any of your employees, agents or subcontractors are on the
Owner's premises, you are solely responsible for providing them with a safe
workplace of employment, and you shall inspect all areas where they may
work and promptly take action to correct conditions which are or may
become unsafe.
3

(R. 831). Preferred also promised to adhere "to all safety regulations, including the
applicable Occupational Safety & Health Act and all regulations adopted thereunder
(R. 831).
On March 1, 2004, Preferred5s foreman Todd Jex asked Big-D concrete superintendent Kevin Bums if the Preferred crew could begin building the inside face of a rebar
wall shown on plans as Wall 39. (R. 192). Mr. Jex was a journeyman ironworker with
twenty years experience doing rebar work. (R. 935).
This was not a situation where Mr. Bums or anyone else from Big-D directed or
instructed Preferred to begin building Wall 39, and contrary to Mrs. Begaye's characterization, Big-D did not "send" Preferred5s employees to work on Wall 39. (Appellant's
Brief, p. 2). Rather, Mr. Jex "wanted to make work for his guys,55 and he asked Mr. Bums
if his crew could "tie up55 the wall. (R. 193). Mr. Bums testified as follows:

A:
Q
A
Q
A

As I understand it, before Preferred went to work on this wall they conferred
with you? Wall number 39, the wall that collapsed.
Correct.
And you told them to go to work on wall number 39 next?
I did not.
What did you tell them?
He asked.

(R. 192).
Mr. Bums told Mr. Jex that his crew could "go ahead55 and build the wall. (R. 193).
Mr. Jex, along with three other Preferred employees including Mr. Begaye, began building
the wall. (R. 193).
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Preferred had complete autonomy and discretion over how it completed the wall.
Mr. Jex testified as follows:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A
Q
A:
Q

Who was your primary contact person with Big-D?
Mine was Kevin, Kevin Burns.
Todd, did Kevin ever give you directions as to the methods you used
to put up the rebar?
No. Our job was pretty basic.
Can you recall any instance during the three months or so before this
accident where Kevin gave you a specific instruction about the way to
do your work?
No, he didn't, no.
Did anybody else from Big-D give you that kind of instruction?
No.
Was there someone from Big-D who was assigned to stay with your
crew and watch what your crew was doing?
No.

(R. 193, 213-14). One of the Preferred employees, Tony Whitaker, confirmed that
Preferred put up the wall that day without any interference or suggestions from anyone
else about how to do it:

A:
Q:
A:

Now in terms of the time period that you and the other men were
working on this wall, can you testify as to whether or not anyone who
was working for Big-D came over and told you something about how
to be doing what you were doing?
No.
No one did?
Nobody.

(R. 194,219).
As it put up the wall, the Preferred crew supported the wall by using bracing. BigD was not involved in Preferred's decision to use bracing or in how Preferred used the

5

bracing; "[t]hey had no say-so in what we did." (R. 194, 222). Mr. Jex elaborated by
testifying:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Now, Todd, this way that you were doing the bracing, is that
something that Big-D told you to do that way?
No. That's what we have done for years.
Are you aware of anybody from Big-D even being aware of how you
had braced this particular wall as you were putting it up?
Not that I'm aware of.

(R. 194, 215).

Big-D did not tell them how to brace, where to tie off the rebar, whether

to anchor the wall with guy wiring, or what equipment to use as they were putting up the
wall. (R. 195-96,216).
The manner and method of putting up Wall 39 was exclusively Preferred's
decision, as Mr. Jex elaborated:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:

Now this decision, Todd, to go forward with this wall under the
circumstances without forms in place, without guy wires and by using
the braces only, who made that judgment?
I would say probably myself and then talking to everybody.
Talking to your crew?
Right.
Is that a decision that you depended on in any way for Big-D to make
for you?
No. That's what I decided we would do.
If you had felt that you did not want to go forward with that work
without first having the forms in place, could you have made that
choice . . . . If you felt like you wanted to wait until forms were in
place to do that wall, could you have made that choice?
Yes.

(R. 196,216).

6

The fact that Preferred used bracing as the way to support Wall 39 was not unusual;
according to Mr. Jex, it was "just common practice. We had done some other walls on the
other end this way also." (R. 933). He further testified:
Q:

A:

So from your perspective as of the time this happened was there
anything unusual about the work situation as of the time of the
accident?
No. We all felt pretty good about it and it was the last bar we was
going to put up for the day and go on the next day."

(R. 933). Likewise, Tim Elliot, one of the iron workers employed by Preferred to work on
Wall 39, stated that Preferred supported the walls on the project by bracing rather than by
forms u[m]ost of the time, quite a bit." (R. 933).
The Preferred employees were in control of the specific safety precautions they
took while building Wall 39. Mr. Elliot testified:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

When Big-D runs a job site, Big D controls what happens . . .
As far as scheduling?
Sure.
Well, yeah, they tell us when they want something done.
They control the safety?
Not really. They don't really have too much control over us. They
tell us when they want this wall built and this wall built.
Then you go build it.

A:

Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes.

(R. 223). Mr. Burns confirmed that each employer is in charge of keeping its own
employees safe: "Preferred takes care of their own and I take care of my own." (R. 196,
206).
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As the Preferred crew was putting up the wall, the bracing broke, causing the wall
to collapse. (R. 208-10). The collapse threw Mr. Begaye to the ground, and he was killed.
(R. 2).
B. Procedural History and Disposition Below
Mrs. Begaye filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Big-D in October 2004, and
after more than a year of discovery, Big-D moved for summary judgment on the basis that
Big-D did not exert control over the injury-causing aspect of Preferred5 s work. (R. 1-6,
227-29). Mrs. Begaye responded with a request to conduct more discovery pursuant to
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). (R. 230-33). During the hearing on Mrs. Begaye's
Rule 56(f) motion, her counsel conceded that their argument against summary judgment
largely consisted of a claim that the wall was not constructed safely as opposed to a claim
that Big-D controlled the actual construction of the wall. (R. 1072, p. 22). Big-D agreed
at the hearing to permit Mrs. Begaye to conduct the limited discovery she wished to
conduct before Judge Hilder ruled on the motion for summary judgment. (R. 1072, pp. 3031).
After Mrs. Begaye completed this discovery, she opposed Big-D's motion for
summary judgment and filed her own motion for partial summary judgment on the basis
that Big-D owed Mr. Begaye a duty of safety as a matter of law. (R. 508-917). Judge
Hilder held oral argument on the parties' motions in May 2006. (R. 1073). Judge Hilder
granted Big-D's motion, noting that Mrs. Begaye's arguments regarding overall safety and
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job sequencing had nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled the manner and method
of putting up the wall. (R. 1073, p. 9). Judge Hilder explained his ruling as follows:
[T]he case law has kept it pretty narrow. It's about operative details, it's
about the control over the method, the mode of the actual task. The
dilemma, I think, and I think that it's a strong policy dilemma, is we can't
get into a situation where an owner or a general who takes seriously safety
obligations, which it is very clear Big-D did, is then penalized because they
don't supervise every part of the work unless they're controlling the work.
And it seems to me that the facts are undisputed that no matter what else
Big-D did, it didn't tell the sub how to build the wall, how to brace the wall.
(R. 1073, p. 4). This appeal ensued. (R. 987-88).
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT A: Utah law is crystal-clear that a general contractor like Big-D cannot be

liable for the workplace injury of a subcontractor's employee unless the general contractor
exercised affirmative control over the injury-causing aspect of the subcontractor's work.
Utah courts have narrowly construed the exception to Restatement ( Second) of Torts §
414, under which a general contractor can be liable if he retained control over the
subcontractor's work.
It is undisputed that Big-D did not tell Preferred to support Wall 39 by using
bracing and that Big-D did not actively participate in the bracing of Wall 39. Indeed,
while Mrs. Begaye faults Big-D on appeal for not stopping what she claims was an unwise
decision on Preferred's part to support the wall with bracing, this simply bolsters the
critical point that Big-D was not directing Preferred's manner and method of erecting the
wall. Judge Hilder correctly focused on the facts that were relevant to the pertinent legal
9

inquiry of control over the manner and method, and he appropriately granted summary
judgment to Big-D.
POINT B: The panoply of irrelevant facts that Mrs. Begaye recites to support her
position that summary judgment should be reversed strays far from the legal question of
whether Big-D retained control over the injury-causing aspect of Preferred's work. These
immaterial facts fall into two categories: facts regarding Big-D's scheduling and
sequencing of the project to move it forward, and facts regarding Big-D's general
supervisory role over project safety. Courts have accurately recognized that these powers
of a general contractor are normal and necessary, and that they do not mean the general
contractor is micro-managing the details of a subcontractor's work. This Court should not
be distracted by evidence that has nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled the manner
and method of bracing Wall 39.
VI.

ARGUMENT
A.

Big-D Cannot Be Held Liable Under Utah Law to a Subcontractor's
Employee Where Big-D Did Not Direct the Injury-Causing Aspect of the
Subcontractor's Work.
1.

UTAH HAS A LONG HISTORY OF LIMITING A
GENERAL CONTRACTOR'S LIABILITY TO UNIQUE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE
INJURY-CAUSING WORK.

While many legal practitioners consider Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d
322, to be the elucidating Utah case regarding the retained control doctrine, there are two
state court cases preceding it where the Utah Supreme Court recognized the concept that a
10

general contractor or owner should not be responsible for a workplace injury unless it
controlled and directed the injury-causing work. In Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P.
408 (1914), a subcontractor's employee was injured while working on a tunnel. He sued a
number of parties, including the general contractor, Snake Creek Mining & Tunnel
Company ("Snake Creek"). At trial, the court granted Snake Creek's motion for directed
verdict because it had no duty to protect the employee from the negligence of its subcontractors. Dayton, 148 P. at 409. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
even though Snake Creek could require subcontractors to reinforce portions of the tunnel
by using the method it saw as most appropriate, could alter the subcontractors' work at its
discretion, could require subcontractors to correct insufficient work, could demand that
subcontractors fire their employees if it showed reasonable cause, and provided much of
the equipment for the project. Id. at 410-11. The court discounted these circumstances
because the general contractor could only be responsible for the employee's injury where it
could
direct or control the work, not only with respect to results, but also with
reference to methods of procedure or means by which the result was to be
accomplished, where the will and discretion of the [subcontractor as to the
time and manner of doing the work or the means and methods of accomplishing the result were subordinate and subject to that of [the general
contractor].
Id. at 411.
In Gleason v. Salt Lake City et ai9 94 Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225 (1937), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a store that had arranged to have the Salt Lake City Fire
11

Department pump its flooded elevator shaft was not liable for injuries the plaintiff sustained when she tripped over the Fire Department's hose. Gleason, 74 P.2d 1225, 1227.
The court agreed that the Fire Department negligently failed to warn pedestrians of the
hose but refused to assign liability to the store because the store had no control over the
Fire Department's work. Id. at 1228. The court restricted "the right to control the manner
and means" of the work to the injury-causing event — "the operations of pumping." Id. at
1228. Mrs. Begaye acknowledges those early Utah cases on appeal but ignores that the
courts refused to impose liability on the contractor or owner despite their control over the
workplace in general. There was no evidence in those cases, as there is no evidence here,
that the general contractor "gave any instructions or directions respecting the work or the
manner in which it should be done." Id. at 1227.
Mrs. Begaye similarly approaches Thompson v. Jess and this Court's adoption of
the retained control doctrine in that case with blinders. She claims that Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 414 "does not limit the application of liability at common law, it
expands it." (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). In reality, § 414 serves as an exception to the
"general common law rule that 'the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor of his servants.'"
Thompson, 979 P.2d at 325. The exception set forth in § 414, the retained control
doctrine, "is a narrow theory of liability applicable in unique circumstances where an
employer of an independent contractor exercises enough control over the contracted work
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to give rise to a limited duty of care . . . ." Id. at 326. She also mischaracterizes the
parameters of the doctrine, vaguely alleging that a general contractor need only exercise
"some" control before it becomes liable for the injury. (Appellant's Brief, p. 13).
Actually, the comment she cites explains that "some degree of control over the manner in
which the work is done" is needed to impose liability, meaning that
[i]t is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work
stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make
suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or
to prescribe alterations or deviations. Such a general right is usually
reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled
as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail.
Id. at 327, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c. The court equated
"retained control" with "active participation," meaning that "a principal employer must
have exercised affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that work." Id.
at 327. Thus, a premises owner who asked a contractor to erect a steel pipe was not liable
when a worker was injured during the erection because the owner did not tell the
contractor how to erect the pipe; rather, the contractor chose a technique for lifting the
pipe, and the worker was injured in that process. The worker was not injured because the
owner directed the employer to erect the pipe, but because the employer chose an unsafe
method. Id. at 328.
Utah courts have reaffirmed the narrowness of the retained control doctrine since
Thompson. The case of Smith v. Hales & Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App. 38, 107
P.3d 701, involved the strikingly similar situation where three men employed by a
13

subcontractor were building a wall. During construction, the wall collapsed, killing one of
the men. The district court granted summary judgment for the general contractor. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, ruling that the general contractor did not actively participate in
the subcontractor's work. The court noted that
[o]ther than generally overseeing the work performed by various
subcontractors, there is no evidence Mr. Egbert trained or instructed
Decedent about how to build or position the wall frames in place . . . .
Id. at 705.
The Utah Court of Appeals reiterated the notion that a general contractor's
supervisory responsibilities do not create liability, and that something like training the
subcontractor's employee on how to do his job would be necessary to create the requisite
control, in Martinez v. Jacobsen Constr. Co., Inc., 2005 UT App. 136 (unpublished
opinion) (attached at Addendum A). The court's analysis merits quotation at length
because it addresses Mrs. Begaye's contention that Big-D's contractual assumption over
general workplace safety somehow meant that it was directing Mr. Begaye how to erect
Wall 39:
Plaintiff points to Defendant's directives to [subcontractors] Steel Deck
Erectors and Truco regarding fall protection, Defendant's safety inspections
and checklists, and Defendant's project manager's and superintendent's
acknowledgement of responsibility to look for and correct dangerous
working conditions, Defendant's monitoring of wind and weather, and
Defendant's imposition of overtime. Though these factors, taken together,
suggest a general supervisory role by Defendant, they do not rise to the level
of control over the "method or operative detail of the injury-causing activity"
necessary to impose liability. Indeed, it is undisputed that Defendant did not
train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to do their jobs. In particular,
14

Defendant did not supervise or train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how
to install the tie-off system. Rather, Defendant simply required its subcontractors to perform their work safely and in compliance with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration requirements. "This
amounted merely to control over the desired result, which is insufficient to
come within the retained control doctrine." Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at f 24.
The Utah appellate courts have not encountered a situation where the narrow
retained control exception to the general rule of non-liability would apply. A general
contractor would have to insinuate itself actively into a subcontractor's work in order to
retain the requisite level of control. That clearly did not happen with Big-D and Preferred.
2.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT BIG-D DID NOT DIRECT
PREFERRED ON HOW TO SUPPORT WALL 39.

Big-D simply gave permission to Preferred to achieve a result on the day of the
accident. Preferred asked if it could build Wall 39, and Big-D told it to go ahead.
Preferred's job was "pretty basic," and it knew how to do the job. Preferred did not need
anyone from Big-D to watch over and give directions as it was building the wall, and no
one from Big-D purported to do this. Importantly, it was up to Preferred to decide how to
support Wall 39. If it wanted to use bracing or forms or guy wiring, that was its decision,
and it did not need to obtain approval or permission from Big-D beforehand.
The wall collapsed because the bracing broke, and Big-D had no control over this.
Big-D did not actively participate in bracing the wall. It was not helping Preferred's crew
put up the wall, and it was not telling the crew how to do it. Mrs. Begaye does not claim,
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as she cannot, that Big-D actively directed the manner and method by which Preferred
chose to brace Wall 39. Summary judgment should therefore be affirmed.
3.

BIG-D IS NOT LIABLE UNDER ANY OTHER RESTATEMENT
SECTION.

Mrs. Begaye mentions in passing that if Big-D is not liable under the retained
control doctrine, its "involvement in the safety aspects over the course of the project also
made Big-D liable under either §§ 323 'Negligent Performance Of Undertaking To Render
Services' or 324A 'Liability To Third Person For Negligent Performance Of Undertaking'
. . . ." (Appellant's Brief, p. 19 n.l). She does not set forth any facts or analysis
supporting the use of either of these sections. She did not brief this argument to the
district court but relegated it to the same fleeting footnote she gives it on appeal. This
Court should not seriously consider any argument on appeal that Mrs. Begaye did not
seriously pursue below. Midvale City Corp. v. Halton, 73 P.3d 334, 339 (Utah 2003).
B.

Big-D's Control Over Sequencing and Workplace Safety Do Not
Equate to Control Over the Manner and Method of Preferred's
Bracing of Wall 39.

The fact that Big-D, as a general contractor, had the ability to control and direct
certain things on the construction project is not surprising or unusual. A general
contractor is in charge of making sure the project gets finished, and it must have
concomitant powers to achieve this. If these powers were enough to impose liability on
general contractors, they would always be legally responsible for workplace injuries.
Mrs. Begaye points to various abilities that Big-D exercised during the project, but they
16

are all irrelevant because none of them has to do with control over Preferred's method of
bracing Wall 39 on the day of the accident.

1.

FACTS INVOLVING CONTROL OVER SEQUENCING DO NOT
CREATE A DUTY OWED BY A GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO
A SUBCONTRACTOR'S EMPLOYEE.

Mrs. Begaye acknowledges that Big-D acted in the typical capacity of a general
contractor by retaining control "over workflow, timing and sequencing," as well as
"direction over subcontractors to coordinate and arrange the timing of tasks." Big-D
superintendent Kevin Burns could tell subcontractors "where to go next," and he acceded
to Preferred foreman Todd Jex's request that his crew work on Wall 39 because that was
"where they would be headed next." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 2, 4-5). Indeed, part of any
general contractor's role is to schedule and coordinate the work of subcontractors, as well
as to direct them to the next task. Big-D's authority to do so does nothing to imply that
Big-D affirmatively participated in the operative detail of Preferred's work on Wall 39 on
March 1,2004.
It is also true that "construction of the walls represented a cooperative effort
between Big-D and Preferred." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). Every part of the construction
project called for cooperation between Big-D and the subcontractors, and this is common
and necessary in the construction industry. Again, this does not mean that Big-D
insinuated itself into the method by which Preferred built Wall 39. Mrs. Begaye claims,
however, that because Preferred started building it without a form in place, Big-D allowed
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Preferred to build the wall in a way that "deviated from the sequencing and workflow set
forth by Big-D's own schedule." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). First, whether deviations in
workflow occurred has nothing to do with whether Big-D controlled Preferred5 s work.
Second, walls had been erected on the project prior to March 1, 2004, without forms in
place, so Preferred5 s method of building the wall was not unusual or unprecedented.
The Utah Court of Appeals explained in Martinez that a general contractor
exercising its general supervisory role is not the same as exercising affirmative control
over a particular aspect of a subcontractor's work. Other courts agree that control over
sequencing work does not impose liability on the general contractor for workplace injuries.
In Piper v. Jerry's Homes, Inc., 671 N.W.2d 531 (Iowa App. 2003), the court concluded
that a general contractor was not liable to a subcontractor's employee who fell through an
unguarded stairwell because he coordinated the work performed by the subcontractors and
check on their progress. The court in Martinez v. Asarco Inc., 918 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir.
1990), accepted plaintiffs points that the general contractor controlled commencement of
the subcontractor's work, scheduled the work, and determined when the work would end;
the court nonetheless granted summary judgment for the general contractor because
all of the asserted Asarco actions concern control over only the sequence of
the work. Such control is insufficient to establish liability under section 414
as applied by Arizona courts.
Martinez, 918 F.2d at 1475; see also Sullins v. Third and Catalina Constructions
Partnership, 602 P.2d 495, 500 (Ariz. App. 1979) ("The right to program or direct the
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sequence of the work . . . does not give defendant the right to control the method or
manner of doing the work.")
Big-D is not responsible for Mr. Begaye's death merely because it moved the
project along and allowed Preferred to build Wall 39 on the day of the accident. It means
only that Big-D had a say in when Preferred put up the wall, but Big-D did not participate
in the manner and method of putting up the wall.

2.

FACTS INVOLVING CONTROL OVER SAFETY DO NOT
CREATE A DUTY BY A GENERAL CONTRACTOR TO A
SUBCONTRACTOR.

The next category of facts that Mrs. Begaye points to on appeal, safety measures,
are indicia of Big-D's management of the construction project. They are similarly
irrelevant to whether Big-D retained control over the manner and method of erecting Wall
39. Such facts establish only that Big-D had a "general supervisory role" over safety,
which is insufficient to create a duty toward a subcontractor's employee. Martinez, 2005
WL 615106 at *2.
a.

Safety Provisions in the Owner Contract Are Irrelevant.

Mrs. Begaye starts with the construction contract between Big-D and the project
owner, which states that Big-D "shall take reasonable precautions for the safety of. . .
employees on the work." (Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The contract further provided that
Big-D was responsible to ensure subcontractor compliance with OSHA regulations.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). The fact that Big-D, the only contractor on the project who
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directly contracted with the owner, assured the owner that the workplace would be safe,
has nothing to do with control over Preferred's manner and method of erecting the wall.
The court in Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 807 N.E.2d 480 (111. App. 2004)
recognized this distinction when it affirmed summary judgment for a general contractor
who was contractually responsible for implementing a safety program that included citing
subcontractors for rules violations and employing a safety director; while this indicated a
general statement of control, "[w]e do not, however, equate those safety responsibilities
with control over the means and methods of [the subcontractor's] steel erection work . . . ."
Martens, 807 N.E.2d at 490.
Like Mrs. Begaye, the plaintiff in Martinez had contended that the general
contractor's agreement with the owner to be solely responsible for "all construction
methods and for providing a safe work environment on the job site" meant the general
contractor retained control over the work that caused his injury. The court rejected this
argument, noting that the general contractor's subcontracts required the subcontractors to
be responsible for jobsite safety. "Therefore, even if Defendant did have responsibility for
safety vis-a-vis the owner, that responsibility was passed on to the various subcontractors."
Martinez at **l-2. Big-D's subcontract with Preferred made Preferred "solely responsible
for providing [its employees] with a safe workplace" and for complying with OSHA
regulations applicable to its work. Preferred accepted this responsibility in the contract,
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and its foreman acknowledged that it was his duty, not Big-D's, to keep his employees
safe on the job.
b.

Big-D's Enforcement of Safety Regulation Is Irrelevant.

Next, Mrs. Begaye contends that apart from contractual agreements, Big-D's actual
enforcement of enforced safety regulations, from "interfering] with subcontractor work
on more than 43 separate occasions" to making workers wear seat belts,1 makes it liable.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-6). The fact that Big-D instructed subcontractors to comply with
safety standards and intervened when it observed subcontractors engaging in unsafe
practices simply demonstrates that Big-D was a diligent and conscientious general
contractor. It does not mean that Big-D interfered with the manner and method of erecting
Wall 39. Merely ensuring that safety precautions are observed on a construction project
does not create a duty. See Aguirre v. Turner Construction Co,, 2006 WL 644009 (N.D.
111. 2006) (attached at Addendum A)(affirming summary judgment for the general
contractor because "[enforcement of safety standards does not constitute control over the
'incidental aspects' of subcontractor work.") Moreover, it does not make sense from a

!

She also claims that Big-D stopped work when subcontractors "filed to comply
with OSHA bracing requirements." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). The record cite she gives
for this assertion is a page from her Opposition to Big-D's Motion for Summary
judgment, where she notes that Big-D stopped plumbers from working in a trench that
was not properly reinforced and refused a request by another subcontractor to work in a
trench because the subcontractor "must follow OSHA guidelines." ( R. 515, 655).
Neither of these instances has anything to do with bracing for a wall and does nothing to
suggest that Big-D exerted control over Preferred's decision to brace Wall 39 on March 1,
2004.
21

public policy standpoint to pin liability on a general contractor for the injury of a worker
over whom they have no control because the contractor strives to create an injury-free
workplace. Aguirre, 2006 WL 644009 at *5 ("penalizing a general contractor's efforts to
promote safety and coordinate a general safety program among various independent
contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves to advance the goal of work site safety.")
(citation omitted).
c.

Big-D's Omissions Are Irrelevant.

Mrs. Begaye additionally faults Big-D for what it did not do. Relying on testimony
from her safety expert, Don Rigtrup, she maintains that Big-D should have reviewed
OSHA and ANSI standards before Preferred worked on Wall 39, and that it should have
performed a job hazard analysis because the erection of the wall was supposedly an
unusually dangerous task.2 (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8). Mr. Rigtrup does not explain
what OSHA or ANSI standards he is referring to or how review of them would have
prevented the accident, and his opinion is too vague to be meaningful. Regarding the job
site hazard analysis, Big-D's Request for Proposal to Preferred simply informs potential
subcontractors that "[a]t Big-D's site superintendent's request, a job site hazard analysis

2

Mr. Rigtrup does not state that the failure to perform a job hazard analysis
"directly led" to Mr. Begaye's death, contrary to Mrs. Begaye's representation. Instead,
he claims that performing such an analysis "would have most probably prevented the
overturning of the wall." (R. 761). This opinion is pure speculation without any basis in
fact, and it is insufficient to create a meaningful factual issue. Thurston v. Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391, 397 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (expert opinion
based on guesswork is inadmissible).
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will be required to be submitted 24 hrs before any task, the superintendent considers
necessary, is performed . . . ." (R. 812). No expert analysis is necessary to determine
whether Big-D should have requested a job site hazard analysis because it was in Big-D's
discretion to request it. Furthermore, Mr. Rigtrup offered no foundation to testify that
Wall 39 was an "unusually dangerous task." He is not an expert on rebar walls and is no
more qualified to testify about Wall 39 than any of the people who actually built the wall.
In any event, Preferred foreman Mr. Jex emphasized that there was nothing unusual or
dangerous about building Wall 39 or supporting it with bracing; "that's what we've done
for years."
Hindsight ruminations about what Big-D should have done that might have
prevented the accident are irrelevant. They distract from the only issue pertinent to
whether Big-D is liable for Mr. Begaye's death: whether Big-D affirmatively controlled
the method or operative detail of Preferred's work in bracing Wall 39. As the court in
Ruiz v. Herman Weissker, Inc., 130 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2005), observed,
a hirer's failure to correct an unsafe practice of which it was aware, and that
it retained the authority to correct, does not "affirmatively contribute" to the
employee's injury and thus will not support the assertion of a claim against
the hirer arising out of that injury.
Ruiz, 130 Cal. App. 4th at 65.
By contending that Big-D's ability to sequence work and monitor job safety should
be considered on appeal, Mrs. Begaye is essentially asking this Court to ignore the relevant
and intentionally narrow question of whether Big-D controlled the means by which
23

Preferred braced Wall 39. She wants to hold Big-D liable based on the necessary
circumstance that Big-D, as the general contractor, had general responsibility for
coordinating and overseeing the work of the subcontractors.
If this Court were to abandon the reasoning in prior Utah cases and agree with
Mrs. Begaye that Big-D is liable because of its status, it would hugely expand the scope of
general contractors5 liability. It would render every general contractor liable not only for
the general contractor's own employees, but also all the work of all subcontractors'
employees, regardless of whether the general contractor had anything to do with the
injury-causing aspect of the subcontractor's work. Employees of subcontractors would
effectively become direct employees of general contractors. A general contractor could be
liable if an employee of its subcontractor was injured in an accident due to failure to wear
a seatbelt, regardless of whether the general contractor knew the employee was driving
without a seatbelt.

This would make the retained control doctrine all-encompassing

rather than the narrow exception to non-liability it is meant to be.

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Begaye has not presented any reason to reverse Judge Hilder's grant of
summary judgment to Big-D. Big-D was not insinuating itself into Preferred's task of
erecting Wall 39 on the day of the accident; instead, Preferred went about doing its work
as it had before on that project, doing the job it was hired to do and knew how to do.
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Big-D cannot be held responsible merely because it acted as a general contractor.
Big-D requests that this Court affirm the trial court's decision.
DATED this ( f l ^ d a y of February, 2007.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

John R. Lund
Julianne P. Blanch
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Before Judges
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BENCH,

GREENWOOD,

and

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
GREENWOOD, Judge:
*1 Plaintiff Russell Martinez appeals the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendant Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. "
Summary judgment is proper only when 'there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' "
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,1 12, 979 P.2d 322
(citation omitted).
Plaintiff, a steelworker employed by a steel erection
subcontractor, argues that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant
because material issues of fact exist as to whether
Defendant, as the general contractor for the
construction project, retained and exercised a right

of control over worker safety sufficient to create a
limited duty under the "retained control" doctrine. "
[T]he issue of 'whether a "duty" exists is a matter
of law' which we review for correctness."
Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403,
405 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted).
"Utah adheres to the general common law rule that '
the employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act
or omission of the contractor or his servants.' "
Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at 1 13 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 (1965)).
However, a narrow exception to this rule, the "
retained control" doctrine, applies when "an
employer of an independent contractor exercises
enough control over the contracted work to give rise
to a limited duty of care ... confined in scope to the
control asserted." Id. a t l 15.
We recently analyzed the "retained control"
doctrine, stating that "under Thompson, retained
control requires active participation in the method
or operative detail of the injury-causing activity in
order to impose liability." Smith v. Hales &
Warner Constr., Inc., 2005 UT App 38,1 10, 518
Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant retained control
via the contract between the owner of the
construction project and Defendant in which
Defendant agreed to be solely responsible for "all
construction methods and for providing a safe work
environment on the job site." In support of this
proposition,
Plaintiff
cites
language
from
Thompson:
The term "retained control" may have a more
syntactically correct application to sophisticated
parties who, by contract, stipulate which party will
control the manner or method of work or the safety
measures to be taken-such as in contracts between
general contractors and subcontractors involved in
construction projects.... The issue, however, of
whether a duty of care may be imposed solely as a
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result of such a contractual reservation is not before
us.
1999UT22at ( I26n.3.
Plaintiffs reliance on this language is misplaced. In
this case, Defendant subcontracted the steel work
on the construction project to Masco, Inc., which
subcontracted portions to Steel Deck Erectors,
which, in turn, brought in Plaintiffs employer,
Truco under a subcontract. The contract that
Plaintiff refers to is only between Defendant and the
owner of the project. Thus, it is doubtful that the
Thompson footnote applies to this case. Instead, this
case is similar to Smith, in which we found further
support for refusing to apply the "retained control"
doctrine to hold the owner liable to the deceased
employee's relatives because "the actual supervisor
of Decedent ... had a subcontract with [the rough
carpentry subcontractor], which in turn was a
subcontractor with the general contractor." 2005
UTApp38atIll.
*2 Furthermore, it is undisputed that in all its
subcontracts, Defendant required its subcontractors
to be responsible for job site safety. The subcontract
form was attached to and incorporated into the
contract between Defendant and the project owner.
Therefore, even if Defendant did have responsibility
for safety vis-a-vis the owner, that responsibility
was passed on to the various subcontractors.
Plaintiff maintains, however, that there is more than
a bare contractual reservation on which to base a
duty in this case. Particularly, Plaintiff points to
Defendant's directives to Steel Deck Erectors and
Truco regarding fall protection, Defendant's safety
inspections and checklists, Defendant's project
manager's and superintendent's acknowledgment of
responsibility to look for and correct dangerous
working conditions, Defendant's monitoring of wind
and weather, and Defendant's imposition of
overtime. Though these factors, taken together,
suggest a general supervisory role by Defendant,
they do not rise to the level of control over the "
method or operative detail of the injury-causing
activity," id. at f 10, necessary to impose liability.
Indeed, it is undisputed that Defendant did not train
Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to do their

jobs. In particular, Defendant did not supervise or
train Plaintiff and other steel workers on how to
install the tie-off system. Rather, Defendant simply
required its subcontractors to perform their work
safely and in compliance with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration requirements. "
This amounted merely to control over the desired
result, which is insufficient to come within the
retained control doctrine." Thompson, 1999 UT 22
at 5 24.
In sum, because Defendant did not actively
participate in the steel work itself, or the safety
system for the steel work, Defendant's participation
is insufficient to create a duty under the "retained
control" doctrine under Utah law.FN1
FN1. Plaintiff also argues that if Defendant
owes Plaintiff a duty of care, summary
judgment was improper because material
issues of fact exist as to whether Defendant
breached this duty and whether such
breach is a proximate cause of Plaintiffs
injuries. However, because we determine
that no duty of care exists in this case, we
do not reach these issues.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate
Presiding Judge.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: GREGORY K.
ORME, Judge.
UtahApp.,2005.
Martinez v. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2005 WL 615106 (Utah
App.), 2005 UT App 136
END OF DOCUMENT
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FACTS
Briefs and Other Related Documents
Aguirre v. Turner Const. Co.N.D.Ill.,2006.Only the
Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,N.D. Illinois, Eastern
Division.
Jose Antonio AGUIRRE, et al. Plaintiffs,
v.
TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, et al.
Defendants.
No. Civ.A. 05 C 515.
March 9,2006.
Milo W. Lundblad, Charles E. Webster, Glen
Joseph Dunn, Jr., Marvin A. Brustin, Marvin A.
Brustin, Ltd., Chicago, II, Jennifer Marie Hill,
Worth, EL, for Plaintiffs.
Jenna Lynn Schoeneman, Bryon D. Knight,
Matthew Scott Clark, Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik &
Knight LLC, Des Plaines, IL, Jon B. Masini, John
M. Schmidt, Margaret Marta Donnell, Scott Alan
Ruksakiati, Steven C Swanson, Fisher Kanaris,
P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CONLON, J.
*1 Plaintiff Jose Antonio Aguirre was injured while
working as a bricklayer during the renovation of
Soldier Field when he fell from a scaffold. He and
his wife Maria Aguirre filed a fourteen-count
personal injury and loss of consortium complaint
against contractors involved in the renovation
project. All but two of those defendants were
dismissed from the case. Dkt.20, 36. The remaining
defendants are the construction manager for the
project, TBMK, a joint venture, comprised of
Turner Construction Company, Barton-Malow
Company, and Kenny Construction, as well as
Chicago Bears Stadium, Inc. Before the court are
the parties' cross motions for summary judgment.

The facts material to summary judgment are
undisputed unless otherwise noted. TBMK was the
construction manager of the Soldier Field
renovation project. TBMK's contract with the
developer required TBMK to "take all necessary
precautions and institute programs necessary to
ensure the safety of the public and of workers
performing the Work on the job, and to prevent
accidents or injury to persons on the Site.
Construction Manager shall comply with all Legal
Requirements relative to safety and the prevention
of accidents." Pl.Ex. E. The contract required
TBMK to appoint a safety superintendent to
oversee safety on the project.
In furtherance of its obligations, TBMK
promulgated an extensive safety program. All
subcontractors were "solely responsible for the
safety of their employees" and the "training] and
education of] their employees" concerning the
safety program. Def. Exh. R. TBMK employed a
contractor project safety coordinator and other
personnel who oversaw safety on the project.
Specifically, the safety coordinator assisted
subcontractors in preparing their site safety
programs, held monthly safety meetings, audited
safety on the project and had the authority to stop
work if he detected unsafe conditions. Id. TBMK's
safety personnel walked the work site daily to
evaluate compliance with the safety program.
However, the program provided that "[t]he
assignment of construction management or
insurance
safety
personnel
to
monitor
responsibilities for safety is not intended to relieve
the contractor [sic] of their responsibility for
providing a safe and healthy environment for their
employees." Id. TBMK was empowered to stop
work for safety reasons, authority which it
sometimes exercised. TBMK could also fine or
dismiss subcontractors or subcontractor employees
for safety violations. Id. Subcontractors were
required to make daily safety inspections of the job

© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

x agy

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d

J UX U

Page 2

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2006 WL 644009 (N.D.Ill.)
(Cite as: Not Reported in F.Supp.2d)
site and ensure that all subcontractor employees
followed TBMK's safety program. Subcontractors
were required to document weekly safety meetings
concerning topics provided by TBMK.
TBMK contracted with A.L.L. Masonry to
complete masonry work during the renovation.
A.L.L. was required to "perform and furnish all the
work, labor, services, materials, plant, equipment,
tools, scaffolds, appliances and other things
necessary for" the work. Def. Ex. P. A.L.L. "
agree[d] that the prevention of accidents to
workmen and property engaged upon or in the
vicinity of the Work is its responsibility." Id. A.L.L.
prepared and executed a site-specific safety
program and employed a project manager to
oversee the project and administer the safety
program. Def. Ex. Q.A.L.L. employed two
additional full-time safety personnel to ensure that it
complied with the safety program.
*2 A.L.L. was required to build, inspect, and
approve scaffolding for use by its employees.
A.L.L. was required to follow 23 rules for scaffold
construction promulgated by TBMK, including the
use of fall protection for workers more than six feet
off the ground. TBMK could require A.L.L. to
correct deficiencies it observed in A.L.L.'s
scaffolding. TBMK was not required to inspect all
of the scaffolding, but did do so. TBMK imposed
specific design requirements on the scaffold where
Aguirre fell because the design required deviation
from TBMK's general requirements.
Aguirre was employed by A.L.L. as a bricklayer
during the Soldier Field renovation. At the time of
the accident, Aguirre was laying bricks around
garage-style doors on the north end of the field.
Aguirre fell from a scaffold around one of the doors
to the concrete eight to ten feet below when the foot
planks supporting him gave way or flipped. The
scaffold was completed and stocked with bricks and
mortar earlier that morning by A.L.L. employees.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, each
movant must satisfy the requirements of Rule 56.
Clipco, Ltd. v. Ignite Design, LLC, No. 04 C 5043,
2005 WL 1838436, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Aug.l, 2005)
(Conlon, J.). Summary judgment is appropriate
when the moving papers and affidavits show there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). Once a moving party meets its burden, the
non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings
and set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Silk v.
City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir.1999).
The court considers the record as a whole and
draws all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Bay v.
Cassens Transport Co., 212 F.3d 969, 972 (7th
Cir.2000). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 248,
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

n. Chicago Bears Stadium
Aguirre asserts six claims against Chicago Bears
Stadium: negligence (Count V); loss of consortium
based on negligence (Count VI); res ipsa loquitur
(Count IX); loss of consortium based on res ipsa
loquitur (Count X); premises liability (Count XI);
and loss of consortium based on premises liability
(Count XII). Chicago Bears Stadium moves for
summary judgment on all counts. Aguirre does not
contest the motion. Therefore, summary judgment
shall be entered for Chicago Bears Stadium and
against Aguirre on Counts V, VI, IX, X, XI, and
XII. Walker v. McKee, No. 93 C 5962, 1997 WL
182288, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Apr.9, 1997) (Moran, J.).

HI. TBMK
ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard

Aguirre asserts four claims against TBMK:
negligence (Count 1); loss of consortium based on
negligence (Count II); res ipsa loquitur (Count IX);
and loss of consortium based on res ipsa loquitur
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(Count X). TBMK moves for summary judgment on
all counts.

A. Res Ipsa Loquitur
*3 Counts IX and X assert claims based on res ipsa
loquitur. In Illinois, "[t]he purpose of the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur 'is to allow proof of negligence
by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence
concerning cause of injury is primarily within the
knowledge and control of the defendant." '
Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 I11.2d 388, 47 Ill.Dec. 392,
415 N.E.2d 397, 400 (HI. 1970). A plaintiff must
prove two elements in order to establish an
inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur: (1)
the injury ordinarily does not occur absent
negligence; and (2) the instrumentality of the injury
was within the defendant's exclusive control. Gatlin
v. Ruder, 137 I11.2d 284, 148 Ill.Dec. 188, 560
N.E.2d 586, 590 (111.1986). TBMK argues that res
ipsa loquitur should not apply because it never had
control over the scaffold that caused Aguirre's
injury. The court agrees. Aguirre argues that the
floor boards on the scaffold gave way because it
was negligently erected. It is undisputed that A.L.L.
owned the scaffold and finished erecting and
stocking the scaffold earlier on the morning of the
accident. Aguirre fell from the scaffold soon after it
was completed. TBMK contributed nothing to
assembly of the scaffold and never had control over
it. TBMK's summary judgment motion on Counts
IX and X must be granted.

B. Restatement of Torts Section 414
The parties agree that the negligence claim asserted
by Aguirre is governed by Section 414 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 414
provides: "[o]ne who entrusts work to an
independent contractor, but who retains the control
of any part of the work, is subject to liability for
physical harm to others for whose safety the
employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care,
which is caused by his failure to exercise his control
with reasonable care." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 414 (1965). The comments to Section 414
reveal that some degree of control is necessary for

the section to apply. Comment (a) discusses the
amount of control that may be maintained without
incurring liability:
The employer may, however, retain a control less
than that which is necessary to subject him to
liability as master. He may retain only the power to
direct the order in which the work shall be done, or
to forbid its being done in a manner likely to be
dangerous to himself or others.
Id. § 414 cmt. a. Comment b applies to a general
contractor that:entrusts a part of the work to
subcontractors, but himself or through a foreman
superintends the entire job. In such a situation, the
principal contractor is subject to liability if he fails
to prevent the subcontractors from doing even the
details of the work in a way unreasonably
dangerous to others, if he knows or by the exercise
of reasonable care should know that the
subcontractors' work is being so done, and has the
opportunity to prevent it by exercising the power of
control which he has retained in himself.
Id. § 414 cmt. b. Comment c limits the application
of section 414:*4 In order for the rule stated in this
Section to apply, the employer must have retained
at least some degree of control over the manner in
which the work is done. It is not enough that he has
merely a general right to order the work stopped or
resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive
reports, to make suggestions or recommendations
which need not necessarily be followed, or to
prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general
right is usually reserved to employers, but it does
not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his
methods of work, or as to operative detail. There
must be such a retention of a right of supervision
that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work
in his own way.
Id. § 414 cmt. c. It is a factual issue whether a
general contractor retained sufficient control to give
rise to a duty of care. Schreiber v. Idea Eng'g &
Fabricating, No. 99 C 6509, 2003 WL 220971491,
at *2 (N.D.I11. Sept. 5, 2003) (Moran, J.), affd 117
Fed. Appx. 467 (7th Cir.2004) (unpublished). The
question of control should be resolved on summary
judgment where the evidence presented is
insufficient to give rise to a factual issue.
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Aguirre argues that TBMK's extensive safety
program indicates sufficient control to impose a
duty on TBMK, citing Bokodi v. Foster Wheeler,
312 Ill.App.3d 1051, 245 Ill.Dec. 644, 728 N.E.2d
726 (1st Dist.2000). In Bokodi, the plaintiff, a
subcontractor employee, was injured
while
installing metal siding. The general contractor
imposed a detailed safety program, which the
plaintiff claimed established a duty on the general
contractor. Id. at 728. The safety plan included
weekly safety meetings and 29 specific guidelines
that each subcontractor had to follow. Id. at 735.
The general contractor also employed a project
safety manager who inspected the job site to ensure
compliance with the program and held weekly
safety meetings. Id. Any employee of the general
contractor was authorized to stop a subcontractor's
work if it did not comply with the program. Id. The
Bokodi court agreed with the plaintiff, holding that
the pervasive safety program and enforcement by
the general contractor indicated "that defendants
retained control over the operative details of the
work, superintended the entire job, and retained a
right of supervision such that the subcontractors
were not entirely free to do their work in their own
way." Id. at 736.
Bokodi does not apply here because it is
distinguishable on the facts. The safety program in
Bokodi is similar to TBMK's safety program. They
both included specific guidelines to be followed by
subcontractors
and
provided
a
substantial
enforcement mechanism for the general contractor.
However, the contract in this case is distinguishable
from the contract in Bokodi. The Bokodi court
noted that the contract provided subcontractors
would be in control of the operative details of their
work. Id. at 735. In contravention to that provision,
the general contractor "went to great lengths to
enforce the safety standards at the work site." Id.
The court did not cite any contractual provision that
required the subcontractor to control safety. Here,
the contract between TBMK and A.L.L. provided
that A.L.L. controlled operative work details. The
contract also provided that A.L.L. controlled its
workers' safety. A.L.L. was contractually required
to comply with TBMK's safety program, design its
own safety program tailored to TBMK's safety
standards, and employ personnel to ensure

compliance. Because A.L.L. was in control of its
own safety by contract, Bokodi is inapposite.
*5 TBMK points out that the rule in Bokodi is not
applied consistently by Illinois courts:
[E]ven where the employer or general contractor
retains the right to inspect the work done, order
changes to the specifications and plans, and ensures
that safety precautions are observed and the work
is done in a safe manner, no liability will be
imposed on the employer or general contractor
unless the evidence shows the employer or general
contractor retained control over the "incidental
aspects" of the independent contractor's work.
Rangel v. Brookhaven Constructors, Inc., 307
Ill.App.3d 835, 241 Ill.Dec. 313, 719 N.E.2d 174,
178 (1st Dist.1999) (emphasis added). Enforcement
of safety standards does not constitute control over
the "incidental aspects" of subcontractor work. See,
e.g., Martens v. MCL Constr. Corp., 347 Ill.App.3d
303, 282 Ill.Dec. 856, 807 N.E.2d 480, 490 (1st
Dist.2004) (general contractor's broad safety
program with enforcement mechanism did not
constitute control over means and methods of
subcontractor's work); Ross v. Dae Julie, Inc., 341
Ill.App.3d 1065, 275 Ill.Dec. 588, 793 N.E.2d 68,
72 (1st Dist.2003) (citing Rangel ); Beiruta v. Klein
Creek Corp., 331 Ill.App.3d 269, 264 Ill.Dec. 479,
770 N.E.2d 1175, 1182 (1st Dist 2002) (same); Fris
v. Pers. Prods. Co., 255 Ill.App.3d 916, 194
Ill.Dec. 623, 627 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (3d Dist. 1994)
(enforcing safety does not constitute control). These
cases are more persuasive that Bokodi because "
[penalizing a general contractor's efforts to
promote safety and coordinate a general safety
program among various independent contractors at
a large jobsite hardly serves to advance the goal of
work site safety." Martens, 282 Ill.Dec. 856, 807
N.E.2dat492.
TBMK had no duty of care with respect to Aguirre
because it did not have control over the incidental
details of A.L.L.'s work or its workers' safety.
TBMK merely "ensure[d] that safety precautions
[were] observed and the work [was] done in a safe
manner" in compliance with its standards and
A.L.L.'s contractually required safety plan. Rangel,
241 Ill.Dec. 313, 719 N.E.2d at 178. This is not
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enough to establish the requisite control under § 414
. Judgement must therefore be granted to TBMK on
Counts I and II.
This result is buttressed by decisions by other
judges of this court. "The mere retention of a
general right to inspect the work, to order it stopped
or
resumed,
to
make
suggestions
or
recommendations or prescribe alterations or
deviations, or to enforce safety regulations, has
been held insufficient" to constitute control over
subcontractor work. Idea Eng'g, 2003 WL
22071491, at *2 (Moran, J.), affd, 117 Fed. Appx.
467. In Idea, the general contractor required the
subcontractor to obey its safety standards. Id. at *2.
The general contractor also employed two safety
supervisors to inspect subcontractor work, hold
weekly safety meetings, and stop subcontractor
work for failure to comply with safety standards. Id.
These facts were insufficient to create a duty for the
general contractor under § 414. This case is
analogous. See also Pierce v. Chicago Rail Link,
LLC, No. 03 C 7524, 2005 WL 599980, at *15
(N.D.IU. Mar. 15, 2005) (Kennelly, J.) ("[t]he ability
to enforce safety regulations ... does not constitute
control"); Taylor v. Facility Constructors, Inc., 360
F.Supp.2d 887, 893 (N.DJ11.2005) (Shadur, J.)
(citing Rangel ); Dailey, 2002 WL 31101672, at *3
(enforcing safety regulations does not constitute
control over operative details of subcontractor
work). Because TBMK owed Aguirre no duty,
TBMK's argument that Aguirre's expert testimony
should be disregarded need not be reached.

CONCLUSION
*6 Aguirre concedes that Chicago Bears Stadium is
entitled to summary judgment. TBMK owed no
duty to Aguirre because it did not retain sufficient
control over the incidental aspects of A.L.L.'s work.
Therefore, defendants' summary judgement motions
are granted, and Aguirre's cross-motion for
summary judgment is denied.
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